Integrated economic-environmental-energy policy and conflict analysis by Hafkamp, W. & Nijkamp, P.
SERIE RESEARCH mEmORIMDn 
INTEGRATED ECONOMIC-ENVIRONMENTAL-
ENERGY POLICY AND CONFLICT ANALYSIS 
Wim Hafkamp 
Peter Nijkamp 
Researchmemorandum 1986-37 November 1986 
VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT 
FACULTEIT DER ECONOMISCHE WETENSCHAPPEN 
A M S T E R D A M 

INTEGRATED ECONOMIC-ENVIRONMENTAL-
ENERGY POLICY AND CONFLICT ANALYSIS 
Wim Hafkamp, Institute for Environmental Studies 
Peter Nijkamp, Department of Economics, 
Free University 
P. 0. Box 7161 
1007 MC Amsterdam 
August 1986. 

- 1 -
1. Economie Policy Analysis 
The conventional theory of economie policy has usually taken for granted the 
paradigm of rational decision-making on the basis of full information. The 
majority of models designed for economie policy analysis presupposed rational 
behaviour of clearly identifiable, individual decision-makers or of one (col-
lective) decision agency. Given a set of axioms for rational actors confron-
ted with a complex choice situation, these models for economie policy analy-
sis were mainly normative in nature (see for instance, Harsanyi, 1979). 
In many cases, this traditional view on economie policy analysis (represented 
inter alia by unidimensional programming or a priori known utility models) 
was not very realistic, as important institutional and organizational aspects 
of decision-making were neglected, such as multi-level and multi-group proc-
esses, vote-trading, bargaining, power conflicts, impacts of informal pres-
sure and interest groups, and strategie behaviour. These shortcomings have 
in recent years caused the emergence of multiple objective (or multidimensio-
nal) decision analysis (Nijkamp, 1980). 
Multiple objective decision models take explicitly into account the existence 
of goal conflicts, while institutional and procedural aspects of economie 
planning can be included by means of interactive decision strategies (see 
Rietveld, 1981, and Spronk, 1981). Furthermore, in multiple objective deci-
sion analysis, usually a more modest 'satisficer' principle instead of a 
strict optimizing behaviour is assumed (cf. Simon, 1958), based on a compre— 
mise between different and usually conflicting objectives. In this sense the 
rationality paradigm receives a more limited interpretation, viz. as a metho-
dological judgement criterion regarding the (ex ante or ex post) justifiabi-
lity of decisions (see Faludi, 1971). Also Tversky and Kahneman (1981) demon-
strate that the usual existence of systematic biases in judgement influencing 
preference formation violates conventional normative theory on rational beha-
viour (cf. also Sen and Williams, 1982). And finally Kmietowicz and Pearman 
(1981) argue that imcomplete knowledge (for instance, regarding the impacts 
of public policy decisions) undermines conventional decision theory. Alto-
gether, a closer look at multiple objective decision-making is worthwhile. 
A systematic discussion and presentation of the potential of modern multiple 
objective analysis (especially multiple attribute utility analysis) can be 
found in Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and Keeney (1982), among others. For well-
structured and simple choice situations, conventional normative utility-based 
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approaches (such as simple programming models) may still be meaningful, but 
in complex multi-group, multi-level and multi-attribute decision situations 
the utility maximizing axiom is often hard to justify in light of conflicting 
behaviour of actors and groups (cf. Isard and Smith, 1983). In such cases, 
a communication and "learning process between designers of models and deci-
sion-makers may be necessary in order to develop and employ flexible deci-
sion-support models (e.g., based on interfaces between decision-makers and 
models) that serve the need to provide relevant Information in all phases of 
multi-stage decision processes. Especially for conflict analysis and manage-
ment multiple objective models have proven to be extremely helpful (cf. 
Hafkamp, 1984). 
Moreover, complex multi-objective decision processes (in an interactive con-
text, e.g.) can, at each desired moment, be provided with appropriate Infor-
mation regarding trade-offs and efficiency of proposed solutions thanks to 
the emergence of modern computer-assisted and adaptive information systems 
(see Nijkamp and Rietveld, 1984). And finally, various qualitative multiple 
criteria methods are at present available that are capable of treating non-
metric ('soft') data in decision analyses (see Nijkamp et al., 1984, and 
Voogd, 1983). 
However it should be added that other types of models may also provide useful 
insight into complex public choice situations. For instance, simulation mo-
dels (based on Systems Dynamics, e.g.) may also produce meaningful informa-
tion on impacts of alternative policy strategies. An alternative and interes-
ting approach can be found in Wakeland (1976) who used a computer-assisted 
specification of variables and linkages in a complex system in order to deri-
ve a a system of first-order differential equations that is able to generate 
simulations of impacts of alternative policy choices. In a different context, 
Warfield (1976) has developed a so-called 'interpretive structural modeling* 
methodology in which policy actions in complex systems are analyzed by means 
of graph-theoretic approaches. All abovementioned approaches are not in con-
trast with multiple objective decision analysis, but rather complementary. 
This holds expecially true for interactive decision analysis on the one hand 
and man-computer interaction models on the other hand. 
In general, the use of computers appears to have become a prerequisite for 
structuring and analyzing complex multiple objective choice problems, 
especially in case of multi-dimensional goal conflicts. Due to cognitive 
complexity of decision situations (see Janis and Mann, 1977), the need for 
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heuristic learning principles in multi-person decision-making (see Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1981), the tendency to adopt *satisficer' strategies in con-
flict management (see Eilon, 1979), and the existence of different cognitive 
styles in judgement processes (see Henderson and Nutt, 1980), modern computer 
technology constitutes a basic ingrediënt in individual or organizational 
decision processes (including government decision-making). In this regard, 
Decision Support Systems (DSS) have proven to be extremely effective tools in 
less structured choice situations (see among others Bennett, 1983, and Keen 
and Scott Morton, 1978). Given the man-machine interfaces in modern (adapti-
ve) decision analysis, many models (including interactive multiple objective 
decision models) that have recently been developed for policy and decision 
analysis tend to exhibit both descriptive and normative aspects of multidi-
mensional choice problems. 
2» Integrated Economic-Environmental-Energy Modelling 
Economie - environmental - energy planning provides a glaring example of 
conflict analysis. Integrated economic-environmental-energy modelling has 
become increasingly complicated over the past decade. Systems theoretic con-
cepts, optimal control models, game-theoretic approaches and multidisciplina-
ry analyses have become necessary tools for economic-environmental-energy 
analyses. There is a strong tendency towards a more coherent and integrated 
analysis, in which economie, environmental, energy and regional aspects are 
brought together in one consistent framework (see Lakhsmanan and Nijkamp, 
1980). This need for integrated modelling is mainly caused by the f act that 
the post-war economie growth paradigm intertwined with technological, scien-
tific and educational progress and rising population numbers, has overlooked 
inter alia the social and ecological dimensions of this process and hence has 
led to a serious threat for the man-made and natural environment. This deve-
lopment can not only be observed in the developed countries, but also in the 
Third World countries, especially in those areas where a rapid industrial 
expansion is not accompanied by sufficiënt monetary resources for environmen-
tal protection and pollution abatement. Integrated planning and policy models 
provide essentially some necessary means to restore the balance in favour of 
more emphasis on environmental dimensions (cf. also Guldman and Shefer, 
1981). 
Models for an integrated economic-environmental-energy analysis should take 
into account the spatial dimensions of the system at hand, as space is a 
medium through which the economy interacts with the environment and the re-
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source base. Therefore, a closer investigation into the structure of spatial 
economie - or, more precisely, multiregional economie - models is necessary. 
Recently, a world-wide survey of multi-regional economie models has been held 
by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxen-
burg, Austria, and the Department of Regional Economics, Free University, 
Amsterdam (see Issaev et al., 1982). The survey, involving approximately 200 
multi-regional economie models, showed that 50 models were operational at 
that time. However, only three out of these 50 models were economic-environ-
mental models (including the analysis of energy problems), viz. 
MREED, MEEEI and TLM. A brief discussion of MREED and MEEEI is given below, 
together with an outline of a more recent, yet incomplete model for the Uni-
ted States, IMM. The design, construction, and results of TLM (Triple Layer 
Model) will be the main focus of this paper, together with the presentation 
of multi-objective simulation experiments. 
MREEDi Multi-Regional Model of the Economy, Environment and Energy Demand. 
The purpose of MREED is to determine the economic-environmental-energy conse-
quences of alternative national and regional policies for the United States 
(see Lakshmanan, 1979). MREED distinguishes 50 regions within the spatial 
system as a whole, while the production of goods and services in these re-
gions is analyzed and modeled on the basis of 53 sectors. This model has 
approximately 880 endogenous variables for each region. Some main features 
can be found in Table 1. 
Level 
Type of 
variable 
National Regional 
Economie Taxes, 
Depreciation 
Interest Rates 
Investments 
Sectoral Output 
Capital Stock 
Fuel Pri ces 
Employment Employment Labor Demand 
Environment Energy Demand 
Number of Heating Days 
Table 1: Some features of MREED 
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Production functions of the so-called KLEM type are used in MREED, involving 
functions that have, as arguments, the following factors: capital, labor, 
energy, and raw materials. The actual production functions used have a trans-
log specification. 
MEEEI; Inter-Regional Policy Model for Energy-Economic-Environmental Inter-
actions. The purpose of MEEEI is to study interactions between energy, envi-
ronment, and the economy in general. (See Lesuis et al., 1983). It is a bi-
regional model of The Netherlands modeling the production of goods and ser-
vices in 11 sectors, containing some 100 variables (see for some details also 
Table 2). 
MEEEI uses an extended I-O model as a production function. Fixed technical 
coefficients have been assumed for production factors, labor, and energy. The 
model deals with (exogenous) changes of prices via a regional translog price 
possibility frontier. 
Variable 
type 
National Regional 
Economie Exports, Production 
Employment Employment 
Environment Pollution, Energy 
Demand 
Table 2: Some features of MEEEI 
A new promising approach to multi-regional economic-environmental modeling 
which is still in an experimental stage, is chosen by Isard et al. in the 
Integrated Multiregional Model (IMM) for the United States. lts major aim is 
to combine a series of existing spatial models. Each of these models focusses 
on specific aspects of the multi-regional system, while there are many over-
laps between the various assembled models. The structure and design of this 
model were first discussed by Isard, Boyce, Lakshmanan, Klein and Caldwell, 
(1981). The following sub-models are constituents of this "master" models 
- NATLEC: a national econometrie model, used to describe changes at the 
national level in a set of national economie variables, such as prices, 
final demand, etc. 
- 6 -
- MULTIPOL: a model for conflict management encompassing procedures for 
describing policy decisions that are basic inputs in other models: 
government expenditure, evolution of energy use, social security, etc; 
see also Isard and Smith (1983). 
- CICIOP: a model, developed by Isard, uses location theory (notably com-
parative cost principles) and industrial complex analysis in order to 
assess optimal production patterns. 
- FACTIN: a model developed by Lakshmanan, which determines the (KLEM) 
factor demand (capital, labor energy, and materials) and regional in-
vestments by sector. 
- REGLEC: a model developed by Klein, and used for projecting employment 
variables (labor supply and demand, unemployment) and wage rates. 
- DEMO: a model constructed by Caldwell; this is a micro-simulation model 
of the household sector, describing expenditure behavior. 
- TRANS: a model for interregional transportation, constructed by Boyce. 
Thus the field of integrated multi-regional economic-environmental-energy 
modeling is still underdeveloped; only in a few countries do such operational 
models for policy analysis exist. Apart from data problems, one of the major 
flaws in designing such models is of a methodological nature: how to combine 
spatial economic-environmental-energy variables in a coherent and consistent 
modeling framework? 
As environmental and energy policy analysis usually takes place in a complex 
field with conflicting goals, various social interests, multiple decision 
groups and power structures, a methodologically sound policy analysis should 
take account of the multidimensional nature and energy problems (see Nijkamp, 
1981). 
In the remaining part of the present paper we will make an attempt at devel-
oping an integrated approach to regional-economic-environmental-energy policy 
analysis by using a so-called Multiple Layer Model (see Hafkamp and Nijkamp, 
1982a, 1982b). It will be shown that recently developed interactive (inte-
grated economic-environmental-energy) policy models appear to provide a pro-
mising perspective for an integrated multiple objective policy analysis. Two 
elements are central in such approaches, viz. efficiënt (or Pareto) solutions 
for conflicting objectives and interactive strategies among analysts and 
policy-makers. In this regard, it will also be demonstrated that multi-re-
gional input-output analysis is a necessary ingrediënt for a meaningful and 
consistent framework for the above mentioned approach. 
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3. Interactive Multiple Objective Decision Analysis 
In this section, a brief introduction to Interactive multiobjective decision 
analysis will be given, as this approach makes up one of the corner stones 
for working with the above mentioned class of Multiple Layer Models» Inter-
active decision analysis is one of the fruitful results of modern computer 
technology. This approach to decision analysis aims at including, in a step-
wise manner, various political (or subjective) considerations in formal opti-
mizing models characterized by multiple policy objectives. A basic feature of 
this approach is that after the specification of (conflicting) objectives and 
the identification of a feasible (not necessarily the most desirable) compro-
mise solution, a set of additional policy desires (for instancef minimum 
achievement levels, reference points, or aspiration levels) may be introduced 
in order to find new feasible compromise solutions that are more satisfactory 
and may lead to an acceptable final choice. 
Interactive approaches have several advantages: a closer involvement of ac-
tors in the choice process, a procedural view of planning, a 'satisficing' 
instead of an optimizing behaviour, a greater flexibility by means of simula-
tion experiments or scenario analyses, and a greater potential for practical 
applications (especially because no policy weights have to be specified a 
priori). The majority of these interactive approaches are based on a referen-
ce point (or ideal point) optimization technique, in which an attempt is made 
at minimizing the discrepancy between a series of points on the efficiency 
frontier and a (series of) reference point(s). It has to be added that espe-
cially procedural interactive policy analyses may be very helpful tools in 
policy negotiations regarding conflicting issues. 
Some essential elements of interactive multiple objective decision analysis 
will now briefly be described. 
Suppose a general (implicity specified) model containing a vector of decision 
variables z^ (instruments, e.g.), of policy target variables j* (with elements 
w^, i»1,...,I), of other endogenous variables JC , and of exogenous data 
f_ U , w, x.» v) » £ (3.1.) 
By solving this model for the endogenous variables v_ and x, the following 
reduced form for the targetvariables may be assumed: 
W_ m £ (£, V_) (3.2.) 
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In addition to (3.2), a set of constrai-nts (technical, social, political, 
economie, etc.) on the whole system may be defined: 
£ e K (3.3.) 
where K represents a feasible area for the variables at hand. 
Then an efficiënt (non-dominated or Pareto) solution may be defined as fol-
lowsi £ £ Kis efficiënt, if no ^ * e K does exist, such that: 
w* * .£ (£*, v) > A* 
and for some i: 
wi • 9± (£* / 2) > wi i £ {1,... ,n} 
(3.4) 
consequently, an efficiënt solution supposes that no other feasible policy 
exists, which is equally good for all policy criteria and better for at least 
one criterion (cf. Despontin, 1980; Nijkamp, 1978, 1980). In general, one may 
impose the condition that any good policy mix is an efficiënt solution, al-
though it is clear that in practice inferior solutions may occur (for instan-
ce, in case of X-efficiency) . Nevertheless, a meaningful policy analysis 
should focus the attention in particular on the efficiency frontier (or 
Pareto curve) in order to identify a policy that will not be dominated by 
other policies. This is especially important in the framework of interactive 
policy models which usually aim at identifying in a stepwise fashion a com-
promise solution located on the efficiency frontier. The identification of a 
'satisficing' (compromise) solution is however, a far from easy task. 
Fortunately, in the field of mathematical programming and mathematical eco-
nomics, much progress has been made in recent years to formulate operational 
optimization procedures for decision problems with multiple objectives (see 
among others, Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Cohon, 1979; Rietveld, 1981, and 
Nijkamp and Spronk, 1981). At present, there is a whole spectrum of different 
multiobjective methods available, in both the field of continuous programming 
analysis (see, e.g. Nijkamp, 1979) and of discrete plan and project evalüa-
tion methods (see, e.g. Voogd, 1983). 
It should be noted however that many multiobjective decision procedures de-
signed in the recent past have not been specifically designed for public-
economic decision-making. The usefulness of these diverse methods and proce-
dures for public-economic policy analysis depends very much on the way prio-
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rities and conflicts of public actors can be taken into account. With re-
spect to this issue, it may be meaningful to make a distinction between 
methods and procedures according to the information available on the deci-
sion-maker's preferences (see, e.g. Hwang and Masud, 1979). Three cases may 
then be distinguished: 
(1) fuil information, (2) limited information and (3) no information. 
Especially in case of limited or zero information, interactive procedures may 
be very helpful. In this regard public decision-making also has a learning 
process. It is worth noting that many problems in an integrated policy analy-
sis do not require an unambiguous solution that represents once and for all 
the optimal state of the system concerned: compromise strategies appear to 
prevail. In light of the process character of many decision problems, an 
interactive policy analysis may therefore, be a reasonable and operational 
approach. This approach is usually composed of a series of steps based on a 
systematic exchange of information (based on computer experiments) between 
decision-makers and analysts. Such interactive approaches are normally 
characterized by the following pair of steps: 
- the analysts propose meaningful and feasible (trial) solutions on the 
basis of a well-defined compromise procedure. 
- the decision-makers respond to each (trial) solution by indicating in 
which respect (i.e., in regard to which effects) the proposed compromise 
is still unsatisfactory (given their views on minimum achievement le-
vels, aspiration levels, etc). 
These pairs of steps are then successively repeated, until after a series of 
computer experiments, a convergence is assured and a final satisfactory com-
promise solution has been identified. As mentioned before, a large number of 
interactive models has recently been developed (see among others, Rietveld, 
1981 and Spronk, 1981). Interactive policy analyses based on multiobjective 
programming methods have already demonstrated their significance in various 
policy problems, also in a public-economie context. No doubt, they may be 
regarded as having many significant advantages compared to traditional opti-
mization methods (see Nijkamp and Spronk, 1&81). 
In the present paper, only one specific type of interactive policy method 
will be dealt with, viz. the method of displaced ideals (see Zeleny, 1976 and 
Nijkamp, 1980). Figure 1 provides a concise presentation of the steps in this 
interactive optimization procedure. More details regarding this method can be 
found in Hafkamp and Nijkamp 11982b) and Hafkamp (1984). 
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The abovementioned procedure can also aligned to scenario analyses for econo-
mie policy-making. A scenario is a consistent set of prospective values of 
plansf goals, instruments and exogenous circumstances. Both single and com-
pound scenarios may be dealt with. Choices among different scenarios may also 
be generated by means of the above mentioned interactive inultiobjective 
methods• 
initialize 1 
calculate 
pay - off 2 
matrix 
generate 
compromise 3 
solution 
select unsatis-
factory 
objective 5 
values 
YES 
STOP 
Fig. 1. Steps of an interactive optimization procedure 
After this concise discussion of the basic elemnts of interactive decision 
analysis, the next section will be devoted to the design of some foundation 
stones for the operational Multiple Layer Model used in the sequel of this 
paper• 
4
* P*ipciples °^ Multiple Layer Projection 
Multiple layer projection is an aid for modelling a system in which spatial 
economie, environmental and socio-political aspects are to be integrated. The 
spatial element implies that the system is analyzed at the level of regions 
interacting with the national level. Consequently, a Multiple Layer Model 
(MLM) is a national-regional economie environmental model. A MLM is the 
adjust 6 
constraints set 
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result of projecting a complex real-world system on (three) mutually 
intëracting parallel layers or dimensions: 
- an economie layer 
- an employment layer 
- an environmental layer. 
Clearly, the number of layers may be higher than three. 
Several aspects of a complex and multidimensional system can thus be depicted 
in various submodels, according to their respective different aspects and 
consequences. 
In addition to a set of layers representing a relevant cross-section or 
submodel of a complex system, one also needs a methodologically sound design 
method for an integrated model. 
The design strategy of MLM implies a three stage procedure, where first a 
simple model is constructed, so as to depict the multiple layer structure and 
to delineate the scope and detail of the model, for instance, by means of 
simple graphs, (see also Hafkamp, 1984). The second step of the design proce-
dure is the construction of a conceptual multiple layer model. The conceptual 
model presents the most important actors and their behavioural mechanisms in 
a non-operational and unspecified form. This second step is described in the 
present section. The third step, assembling the operational multiple layer 
model, is dealt with in the next section. This three-stage design procedure 
is akin to Hempel's 'bridge' principle. 
The conceptual model presented here is a multi-regional model of an economy 
where economie, socio-political and environmental aspects of a society are of 
main importance. Public decision-making and planning in such a spatial system 
will be analyzed in a way analogous to allocation mechanisms in formalized 
economies with public goods and external effects (see also Ruys, 1975). We 
shall explicitly deal with groups of individuals belonging to a certain re-
gion of the spatial system and to a certain interest group (e.g., environmen-
talists, labour unions). 
Conceptually, the model has the following structure. The spatial system con-
sists of a set of regions: 
i - {1, R} (4.1) 
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The elements which are important for regional decision-making are income, 
employment and environmental quality. We shall adopt the following formal 
notation for conceivable states of the system: 
Xr " (vr' 1x' zr }' r E R 
x = (xj, X2, ..«««, XR' 
x e X CR3xR 
x is an R-tuple of vectors describing the state of the entire spatial system. 
jCy is a vector describing the state of the system for region r, where yr 
denotes regional income, lr denotes regional employment and zr denotes 
regional environmental quality 
We assume that a region's welfare position is determined by regional income, 
employment and environmental quality, without being affected by the welfare 
position of other regions (no jealousy effect) . In this framework we abstain 
from the intraregional choice process per se. Therefore, instead of defining 
a regional welfare function, we do assume that a region(al authority)'s 
choice for one or more of the region's objectives can be made, according to 
a well-established choice rule: 
C • {£ * (cl# c2, c3) e R3 | cx + c2 + c3 <l} (4.3) 
If a region r is presented with a specific state S, with a regional charac-
teristics vector %r, it may for instance, indicate that regional environ-
mental quality is to be improved most urgently by choosing 0% - (0, 0, 1). 
If the region cannot decide between an improvement of regional income and 
regional environmental quality, it will choose Cg » (h, 0, h) . Thus cr 
may be considered as region r's 'choice budget'. In the context of this paper 
we will not discuss the regional preference orderings. Further details on 
the aggregation of individual preferences to regional preference orderings 
are found in Hafkamp (1984). Here, we define regional preference orderings 
broadly as: 
Pr: X + X Pr(X) = {JC e X jjc >r x} (4.4) 
where >r is used to denote that state jc is préferred by regio r 
over ïl; Rr (^ ) is the set of states préferred over jc. 
} (4.2) 
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Regions, of course, would like to see their objectives (income, employment 
and environmental quality) at a maximum level, simultaneously. In reality 
this is impossible; not all desired states are equally and simultaneously 
attainable. We adopt the following notation for attainable states of the 
spatial system: 
£r - (yr, lr, zr) r e R 
S » (£l , BJ2.' •••» £R) 
s e S 3 X; s is compact and convex 
(4.5) 
Various policy mixes (combinations of regional economie policy/ environmental 
policy/ and labor market policy) are assumed to enable a central authority to 
"control" the spatial system so as to reach, in principle, any situation 
which is reflected by an element of S* The spatial system, composed of re-
gions / can now be concisely characterized by: 
EE • {i , (X/ C, Pr)/ S} 
A state of the system is called Pareto-optimal, if an improvement of any 
region's welfare position is only possible (i.e., within S) through affecting 
at least one other region's welfare position. It should be noted that here an 
efficiency criterion is defined rather than an equilibrium criterion. The set 
of Pareto-optimal solutions is also known as the set of efficiënt or non-
dominated solutions. The presence of different interest groups that want to 
maximize respectively regional income/ employment or environmental quality 
makes it impossible to identify one single overall best solution. Conse-
quently, formally a multi-decision-maker, multi-objective problem has to be 
solved in order to achieve a state of the system that is a compromise for the 
conflicting interests among groups and regions. This can be done by using the 
interactive method based on displaced ideals and described in Section 3. 
The steps of the interactive compromise procedure are already contained in 
fig. 1. A more detailed description of the way a MLM is coupled with an in-
teractive multi-objective procedure is contained in Hafkamp (1984). 
5. An Operational MLM-model for an Integrated Economic-Environmental System: 
TLM. 
The operational MLM-model is called Triple Layer Model (TLM), since it is 
composed of three sub-models - one for each layer: an economie/ an employment 
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and an environmental sub-model. A detailed discussion of all equations, 
variables and data of these sub-models can be found In Hafkamp (1984)* Zn 
thls sectlon we only dlscuss the maln Unes of the varlous sub-models. 
The economie sub-model comprises a national-regional economie model of the 
Dutch economy. It is the restult of coupling the so-called Secmon-model (see 
Driehuis, 1978) with a multi-regional input-output model of five Dutch re-
gions. The following goal variables are included in this sub-models infla-
tion, current and capital accounts, and economie growth. Policy instruments 
are: taxes and public expenditure, monetary instruments, exchange rate, wage 
and price control. Economie factors are: households, firms, government and 
other agents. 
The relationships between the components of the economie sub-model are des-
cribed by means of 8 modules: production (based on input-output tables); 
final demand (consumption, investment, public expenditure and exports); im-
ports (final products, raw materials and manufacturing inputs); production 
capacity; wages and prices; income; government expediture and social insuran-
ces; monetary system. An extensive description of the economie sub-model can 
be found in Hafkamp (1982, 1984). Here only a summary of the model will be 
given. 
The employment sub-model analyzes primarily the demand^for labor at both a 
regional and sectoral level. For the time being, the supply-side of the labor 
market is considered exogenously determlned by demographic and social devel-
opments. It would be worthwhile however, to include more detailed information 
on demographic developments, education and training endogenously in the 
model. 
The environmental sub-model describes 3 aspects of environmental quality: 
1. Emission of air pollutants caused by: 
a. combustion of fossil fuels 
b. process emissions, etc. 
2. Concentration of air pollutants (via diffusion) 
3. Reduction of emission by: 
a. energy saving, selective growth, etc. 
b. alternative choices of energy sources 
e. anti-pollution technology. 
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The way in which the components of these 3 modules are linked is represented 
in fig. 2. 
policy Instruments economic-environmental impacts objectives 
investment 
policy 
government 
expenditure 
Investments by 
destination 
production 
£j capacity 
invest-
ments by 
origin 
house 
hold 
cons • 
exports 
<economic sub-model> 
production 
prices & wages 
Z 
-* imports 
T 
incomes 
government budget 
social insurances 
$j interest rate 
balance of 
payments 
regional 
income 
employment 
policies 
<employ ment sub-model> 
-9 labor 
demand 
unemployment 
labor supply 
regional 
employment 
fuel saving 
investments 
fuel 
substitution 
pollution 
abatement 
<environmental sub-model> 
r energy demand 
emission of 
$1 pollutants 
regional 
environment 
quality 
Fig. 2: The Triple Layer Model, sub-models and major policy impacts. 
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Pollution of water and soil is not taken into account her e, nor is any at-
tention being paid to the phenomenon of synergetic effects. The following 
pollution categories are taken into account: sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides 
and dust particles. 
The choice of energy source also has an important influence on the emission 
of air pollutants. For example: SO2 emissions in the Ketherlands decreased 
drastically after a large-scale introduction of natural gas, but since a 
switch back to coal or oil took place, a drastic increase occurred. Especial-
ly the shift of electricity plants from natural gas to oil, coal or nuclear 
energy and the further exploration and introduction of alternative energy 
sources (solar energy, wind, etc.) are of great importance to environmental 
quality. 
6. Interactive Multi-objective Programming with the Triple Layer Model 
In this section, we will apply the interactive compromise procedure introduc-
ed in Section 3, to the operational version of TLM. 
In the model five major Dutch regions are distinguished, with three objec-
tives each — income, employment, and environmental quality. This means that 
the compromise procedure produces compromises between regional interests as 
well as between objectives at the regional level. Therefore, a multitude of 
versions of the procedure could be designed so as to reflect a variety of 
institutional -<irrangements under which socio-economic decision-making takes 
place. These institutional arrangements may imply that a single authority, 
viz. central government, is a centralized decision-maker. They may also imply 
that decision-making is entirely left to regional planners, whose decisions, 
votes, wishes, and actions are added up only at the central level. Various 
interroediate arrangements are possible as well, and can be described as 
multi-level decision-making procedures (see in particular, Rietveld, 1981). 
The basic version of the interactive procedure involves a separate optimiza-
tion of all 5 x 3 objectives at every iteration, whlle a choice can be made 
in the procedure between fast covergence (<}>=1? this parameter will later be 
discussed) and slow convergence (<j><1). Simplified versions of the procedure, 
for instance, optimizing separate objectives only at the national level in 
each iteration and adjusting the constraint set for objectives at the nation-
al or regional level, are possible as well (see Hafkamp, 1984). 
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Since the Triple Layer Model has approximately 500 endogenous variables, it 
would be very inconvenient to present the results of each simulation run for 
all these variables. Therefore, throughout this Chapter, we shall express the 
values of the objectives as index numbers. As a base for these index numbers, 
a feasible solution for the model is used which is found by setting all 
instrument variables at a fixed, zero value. 
In order to demonstrate the Interactive compromise procedure we will now 
discuss it step by step — using figure 1 as a guideline — for several 
successive iterations. 
1) Start 
The structure of the decision problem is specified for multi-objective opti-
mization using a computer optimization package (the APEX optimization package 
by CDC) . The selection of unsatisfactory values of objectives is to be done 
by the decisionmakers themselves. For example, they may follow a negotiation 
procedure if they are regional planners. If they are the inhabitants of the 
regional system, they may use a voting procedure, or any intermediate proce-
dure between negotiating and voting. In our application of the compromise 
procedure to the operational version of TLM, we have adopted a simulation 
approach rather than actually having regional planners or voters indicate 
their choices, so that we have only assumed a potential outcome of a negotia-
ting or voting procedure. The interactive compromise procedure thus carried 
out only provides a tentative scenario for a simulation experiment in a 
multi-objective decision-making context. We have carried out the procedure 
with a convergence speed parameter <j> = 0.50. The significance of this para-
meter will be discussed at step 6, where the constraints set is adjusted. 
Iteration 1 
2) Calculate Pay-Off Matrix 
The pay-off matrix is found by optimizing consecutively all 15 objectives. 
Every single optimization of these objectives leads to one column of the 
well-known payoff matrix, which is shown in Table 3. 
- 18 
Table 3i Pay-off matrix of iteration 1. Separate optisdsation of objectivesi 
income, employment, and environmental quality at a regional level. 
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3) Generate Tentative Compromise Solution 
In order to generate the tentative compromise solution, it is necessary to 
identify in the pay-off matrix the maximum and minimum value for each objec-
tive. This leads to the first and second column of Table 4. The compromise 
solution is now found by minimizing a standardized distance function which 
measures the distance between feasible solutions and the ideal, but infeasi-
ble maximum solution which is given in table 3. 
min d = 127 -127 -
XL 
95 
116 - li 
116 - 110 
117 - £1 
117 - 81 
(6.1) 
127 - II 
127 - 94 
117 - li 
117 - 110 
120 - Z5 
120 - 71 
Minimization of (6.1) leads to the compromise solution which is the third 
column of 'Iteration no. 1' in Table 4. 
4) Compromise Solution Satisfactory? 
As discussed in Step 1 of this procedure, we did not have actual decisions by 
regionsor regional authorities on compromise solutions reached, so that a 
hypothetical scenario approach had to be used. At this point we assumed NO, 
implying that the compromise solutions of the first iteration were not satis-
factory . 
5) Identify Unsatisfactory Values of Objectives 
We assumed that the following regional objectives had to be most urgently 
improved: 
Iteration 1 
Region Objective to be Improved 
1 
2 
3 
'4 
income y i 
environmental quality Z2 
income y 3 
income y^ 
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6) Adjust Constraints Set 
At this point in the first iteration, the constraints set is adjusted in such 
a way that in the next iteration the compromise values for the objectives 
selected under the previous step (5) will be higher than the actual compro-
mise values gaven in Table 2. 
The general formulation of raising lower bounds of objectives can be written 
xL,i+l _ xL,i + ^ C , ! _ xL,i); 9 e (0,1). (6.2): 
where: 
xL'*: Lower bound on objective x in iteration i 
xC,i. comprovise value of objective x in iteration i 
<f> : Parameter denoting convergence speed. 
The convergence speed parameter is to. be set at the start of the Interactive 
procedure. A high convergence speed ($=1) implies that from one iteration to 
the next one large improvements are found for objectives selected at step 5, 
while a final compromise may be reached in relatively few iterations, as 
relatively strong constraints are added in each iteration. For the present 
application of the procedure the convergence parameter was set at .50. Con-
sequently the following lower bounds for objectives were added to the con-
straints set: 
yL,2 - 95 + 0.50 (117-95) = 106 1) 
zL,2 = 73 + 0.50 (88-73) = 80.5 
yL,2 = 91 + 0.50 (115-91) = 103 
yL,2 » 99 + 0.50 (118-99) - 106 
zL,2 = 71 + 0.50 (94-7T) - 82.5 
1) This calculation of lower bounds is illustrative only; rounded off figures 
were used. According to Figure 1 we now proceed to the next iteration. 
I t e r e t l o n no. 1 I t a r k t l o n no. 2 I t a r a t l o n no. i 
Ragion Solutlona 
Maxlmw Mlnlaua Comproailae 
Solutlona 
Maxlnum Minimin Compromina 
Solutlona 
Maxima Mlnlaua CoMproalaa Ma 
1 
y l 127 95 117 
11 116 110 115 
c l 117 81 108 
y l 127.4 105.7 126.9 
11 115.8 107.7 115.6 
El 116.0 68 .8 87 .9 
y l 127.4 105.7 121.2 
11 115.8 108.4 115.2 
c l 116.0 78 .4 102.4 
y l 
11 
s1 
2 
y2 133 99 131 
12 116 109 115 
c2 113 73 88 
y2 133.4 99 .2 123.2 
12 115.3 107.7 115.1 
c2 112.5 80 .0 104.3 
y2 131.3 99 .2 117.6 
12 115.3 108.0 114.8 
c2 112.5 92 .2 107.1 
y2 
12 
c2 
3 
y3 122 91 115 
13 117 110 116 
«3 116 72 95 
y3 122.1 103.1 121.4 
13 116.4 108.0 116.2 
B3 115.0 72.4 85.2 
y3 122.1 103.1 115.6 
13 116.4 108.3 115.8 
c3 115.0 78.8 9 6 . 9 
y3 
13 
x3 
4 
5 
y4 127 94 118 
14 115 109 115 
s4 114 77 96 
y4 127 94 122 
15 117 110 116 
• 5 120 71 94 
y4 126.9 106.1 125.9 
14 115.0 107.5 114.7 
c4 112.8 69 .5 82 .9 
y4 127.0 94 .4 113.2 
15 116.6 108.0 116.3 
sS 119.7 8 0 . 9 108.4 
y4 126.9 196.1 120.1 
14 115.0 107.9 114.4 
c4 112.8 77.2 93 .5 
y4 127.0 120.1 125.6 
15 116.5 108.4 115.9 
• 5 114.2 8 0 . 9 9 2 . 7 
y4 
14 
s4 
y4 
15 
• 5 
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Iteration 2 
2) Calculate Pay-off Matrix 
The pay-off matrix is, again, found by optimizing consecutively all 15 
objectives. The difference between this pay-off matrix and the previous 
one are entirely due to the fact that the lower bounds derived in step 
6 of the previous iteration were added to the constraints set. 
3) Generate Tentative Compromise Solution 
The second compromise solution is found by minimizing the standard-
ized distance between the unfeasible maximum solution (see Table 3) and 
the adjusted constraints set. The actual outcomes are contained in 
Table 4 as the second compromise solution. 
The compromise values for regional objectives in iterations 1 and 2 
give a rough approximation of the existing trade-offs in the operation-
al version of TLM, the most noticeable being those between regional 
income and environmental quality: An improvement of 1 percent in envi-
ronmental quality of regions 1, 2, and 5, roughly leads to a 0.5 per-
cent loss of regional income. Regional employment appears to be quite 
invariant under the choices made, because employment policy can be 
carried out independently from policies that aim for either economie 
growth or environmental quality (both of which have favorable impacts 
on employment) .The compromise solution of the first iteration caused 
the choice of priority in region 1 to move to regional income. As a 
result, the compromise solution of the second iteration shows that 
regional income was increased by 8.5 percent.Along with this increase 
of income came a sharp decrease of the the environmental quality indi-
cator by more than 18 percent. This sharp switch may result in a gene-
ral tendency to support the environmental interest in the second itera-
tion. 
In region 2 a reverse trade-off was chosen. The first iteration 
indicated that there was strong support for environmental quality. The 
actual outcome, an 18 percent improvement of the environmental quality 
indicator against a decrease in income of more than 6 percent, may be 
very satisfactory to the core of environmentalists but, to many, this 
may be an "over-exchange". In this region the tendency may be to sup-
port the objective of regional income in the second iteration. 
In regions 3 and 4, the choice for regional income resulted in a 6 
percent improvement of income which is paid off by a decrease of envi-
ronmental quality of over 10 percent. This choice situation is equiva-
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lent to that of region 1. In region 5 a situation nas arisen which is 
comparable to that in region 2. A choice for a better environment 
results in a strong improvement of the environmental quality indicator 
by 15 percent which is accompanied by a 7 percent decrease in regional 
income• 
4) Compromise Solution Satisfactory ? 
We assume the second compromise solution is not satisfactory. 
5) Identify ünsatisfactory Values of Objection 
The discussion of the compromise solution at step 3 allows us to 
assume the following objectives as 'most ünsatisfactory' at the 
regional level: 
Iteration 2 
Region Objective to be improved 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
environmental quality 2j 
environmental quality 22 
environmental quality 23 
environmental quality z^ 
income ys 
6) Adjust Constraints Set 
The constraints set is now adjusted in the same manner as in the 
previous iteration. New lower bounds are added to the constraints set. 
Iteration 3 
2) Calculate Pay-off Matrix 
The pay-off matrix is derived in an analogous way to that of the 
previous iterations, taking into account the lower bounds on objectives 
which were raised in step 6 of the previous iteration. 
3) Generate Tentative Compromise Solution 
Generation of the third compromise solution is identical to that of 
the previous iteration. Actual outcomes are contained in Table 4. 
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•4) Compromise Solution Satisfactory? 
In order to demonstrate the procedure to its f uil extent we, again, 
assume that, the third compromise, is not satisfactory• 
5) Identlfy Unsatisfactory Valuese of Objectives 
We assume that environmental quality is to be raised in regions 
1,3,4 and 5* In region 2 an improvement of income is assumed to be 
necessary• 
6) Adjust Constraints Set 
For the objectives selected in the previous step of this iteration 
lower bounds are adjusted according to the procedure described in step 
6 of the first iteration. 
Iteration 4 
2) Calculate Pay-off Matrix 
The fourth pay-off matrix is calculated in a way analogous to the 
previous ones. 
3) Generate Tentative Compromise Solution 
The fourth compromise solution is also contained in Table 4. 
Clearly, from the third to the fourth iteration the adjustement of the 
constraints set by imposing new lower bounds on selected objectives nas 
induced only marginal changes. 
5) Compromise Solution Satisfactory? 
Now we assumed yes; of course, the procedure could easily be contin-
ued. 
7) Tentative Compromise is Final Compromise 
The abovementioned emplrical simulation of the multiregional model 
with conflicting intertests is particularly interesting, this procedure 
involves a doublé trade-off, viz. conflicts between regions operating 
in the same natonial system and conflicts between policy objectives 
operating at both a regionai and a national level. Clearly, from itera-
tion to iteration, the interactive decision-making procedure does not 
only give Information to the decisionmakers on the actual trade-offs 
- 25 -
between objectives (as inherent to the model); but also allows the 
analysts to deduce, from the choices of (groups of) individuals, the 
actual preferences. However, in order to arrive at an accurate assess-
ment of these preferences, it would be necessary to carry out the 
procedure over a large number of iterations. This interactive method 
may thus be an important learning mechanism in an integrated policy 
analysis. 
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